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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
BROOKS BRADSHAW : Case No. 20020137-CA 
Defendant/Appellant 
INTRODUCTION 
Given the ambiguous terms of the communications fraud statute and the absence 
of evidence that Mr. Bradshaw operated an enterprise, the trial judge erred in denying 
Mr. Bradshaw's motion to quash. In its treatment of the communications fraud statute, 
the State erroneously assumes that this statute is plain. To the contrary, that statute is 
confusing and susceptible to multiple interpretations. The State's interpretation of that 
provision represents a drastic departure from the common law, would set Utah apart from 
all other jurisdictions, and raises constitutional challenges to the statute. As for the 
racketeering charge, the State mischaracterizes the record in claiming that Mr. Bradshaw 
failed to preserve his challenge to that count. Both Mr. Bradshaw and the State 
specifically argued below the sufficiency of the evidence that Mr. Bradshaw operated an 
enterprise. The stipulated facts fail to establish that an enterprise existed, in law or in 
fact. For these reasons, this Court should reverse the denial of the motion to dismiss. 
I. THE AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE, COMMON 
LAW DOCTRINES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTIONS BAR THE STATE FROM 
TRANSFORMING MISDEMEANOR OFFENSES INTO 
MULTIPLE, SECOND DEGREE FELONIES 
The communications fraud statute includes confusing language about the penalty 
for separate communications that are part of a common plan or scheme. Because of this 
ambiguous language, the rule of lenity requires this Court to constme the communications 
fraud statute favorably to criminal defendants. The State's proposal to elevate several 
misdemeanor crimes to multiple felony offenses conflicts with the common law and 
would designate Utah as the only jurisdiction that aggregates misdemeanors amounts to 
create multiple felonies. Further, the statute's failure to specify the unit of prosecution 
violates double jeopardy protections. 
A. The Communications Fraud Statute Contains 
Confusing Provisions and Fails to Identify the 
Penalty for Multiple Communications. 
The communications fraud statute does not plainly authorize prosecutors to 
aggregate the amount sought to be taken from all fraudulent communications and then 
charge that amount for each separate communication. Rather, the language of that statute 
is susceptible to multiple interpretations. First, it could be viewed as simply granting 
prosecutors discretion either to charge each communication separately or to aggregate all 
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communications into a single charge that targets an overall "scheme or fraud." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(2), (5) (1999). Second, the State's interpretation, although 
unreasonable and harsh, is another possible reading. Third, because both the separate 
communication and aggregation clauses apply only when made to further a "scheme oi 
artifice," the statute could be read as limiting aggregation of each communication to 
situations when the defendant has devised a plan to obtain a specific amount of money or 
property in a single, overall scheme. Id In other words, the statute may contemplate 
aggregating the total when a scheme targets a specific dollar amount or particular items 
that have specified values. 
Trial judges' various interpretations of this statute support the ambiguity of the 
statute. If the language of the statute were plain, judges would be expected to generally 
agree on the meaning of the words. But, the widely differing views of the language 
suggests that the statute is not as clear as the State claims. Both the text and trial judges' 
application of the communications fraud statute demonstrate its ambiguity. 
B. The Absence of Support From Other 
Jurisdictions Confirms that the State has 
Misinterpreted the Communications Fraud 
Statute, 
Other states' approaches to aggregation clauses undermine the State's reasoning 
Mr Bradshaw agrees with the State that no other state aggregates dollar amounts m the 
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manner the State proposes. But, rather than supporting a legislative intent to punish 
small-time offenders like felons, the uniqueness of the State's interpretation demonstrates 
the extremeness of the State's position. No other state allows prosecutors to aggregate 
the total amounts sought to be taken in several communications, apply that amount to 
each separate communication, and then charge each communication as a felony based on 
the total amount sought. The prevailing view merely authorizes prosecutors to choose 
either to charge separate crimes as misdemeanors or to pool all of the crimes into a single 
felony count. In addition to the cases cited in Appellant's brief, numerous other 
jurisdictions adopt this very approach. Appellant's Brief at 20-21; State v. Brown, 518 
A.2d 670, 673-74 (Conn. Ct. App. 1986); State v. O'Flvnn. 496 A.2d 348, 351 (N.H. 
1985); State v. Jurcsek. 588 A.2d 875, 879 (N.J. Super. 1991). 
The State's extreme position undercuts its arguments. In assessing whether a 
statute is plain, the Utah Supreme Court recently endorsed confirming its reading of a 
statute with other courts' treatment of an issue. State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, ^[12, 52 
P.3d 1276. In Martinez, for example, the high court concluded that a statute plainly 
created a strict liability offense, in part, because the majority of other jurisdictions agreed 
with this position. Id 
In contrast, no other state supports the State's radical interpretation of the 
communications fraud statute. Moreover, the State's argument that the federal mail and 
wire fraud statutes establish felonies is unavailing because those statutes include no 
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aggregation clauses and do not attempt to enhance penalties in the manner the State 
proposes. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-43. The State is simply alone in its quest to transform 
misdemeanor offenses into second degree felonies. 
Because the State's interpretation is so extreme and harsh, this Court should 
require plainer language from the legislature before adopting that view. In this case, for 
instance, the State's approach increases Mr. Bradshaw's potential punishment from a 
maximum of 11 years to a total of 165 years. Numerous other crimes would be affected 
as well because they refer to the specific penalty scheme in the communications fraud 
statute to determine the penalty for similar fraud offenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-
429(2)(b) (1998) (fraudulent obtaining of certificate of compliance for underground 
storage tanks); Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-110(2)(b), (4) (2001) (workers compensation 
fraud); Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-413(2) (1998) (fraudulent selling of motor vehicles); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-52 l(2)(b) (1999) (insurance fraud); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703(3) 
(1999) (computer fraud). Moreover, adopting the State's position would equate 10 
misdemeanor frauds involving $500 each with 10 second degree felonies involving 10 
separate frauds involving $5,000 a piece. This Court should require more specific 
language before imposing such a draconian sentencing scheme. 
As the State concedes, the communications fraud statute is similar to the Louisiana 
statute at issue in State v. Joles, 492 So. 2d 490, 491-92 (La. 1986). State's Brief at 15 
n.8. That Court ruled that "[i]t is much more logical to construe [such a legislative 
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scheme] as evidencing an intent to permit" but not to require prosecutors to aggregate 
several small crimes into one serious crime. UL at 494 (emphasis in original). Without 
the legislature adopting a more definite statement of its intent, the more "reasonable" 
result is to grant prosecutors discretion to treat several small offenses as one large one. 
id 
C. The Common Law and Constitutional 
Protections Support Barring the State From 
Aggregating the Total Amount Sought to be 
Taken in a Scheme and Applying that Amount 
to Each Communication, 
The common law and the federal and state constitutions further undermine the 
State's position. The policies underlying both the single larceny rule and the rule against 
mulitplicity agree that the criminal law favors criminal defendants when construing 
ambiguous criminal statutes. The single larceny doctrine allows the State to treat several 
petty crimes as a single more serious offense. State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 391 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997). But, it also seeks to avoid unfairly imposing multiple penalties when a 
single crime occurs. State v. Barken 624 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1981). Likewise, the rule 
against multiplicity addresses the same concern. United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 
1108 n.4 (6lh Cir. 1988). The spirit of these doctrines bars the State from morphing 
several minor crimes into multiple major offenses. 
The legislature presumably knew of these limitations on the multiplying of charges 
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when it enacted the communications fraud statute. "In enacting legislation, the legislature 
is presumed to be aware of the common law." State v. Hermsdorf, 605 A.2d 1045, 1047 
(N.H. 1992); see also Gottling v. PR. Inc.. 2002 UT 95, ffl[14, 29> 4 5 6 U t a h Adv. Rep. 
14. Although Mr. Bradshaw does not dispute that generally courts should harmonize the 
provisions of a statute, this Court must also consider existing common law doctrines 
when construing statutory text. Reading the communications fraud statute as merely 
providing prosecutors discretion to aggregate multiple misdemeanor charges into a single 
felony count is consistent with the common law policy of avoiding multiple or excessive 
punishments and gives meaning to each subsection of the statute. 
As discussed above, the Louisiana Supreme Court came to this same exact 
conclusion in addressing a similar statute. Joles, 492 So. 2d at 494-95. Although the 
State concedes the similarities between the communications fraud statute and the theft 
statute in Joles, it argues that Joles is distinguishable because the single larceny doctrine 
does not apply to crimes "involving distinct acts with distinct victims." State's Brief at 15 
n.8. The State fails to recognize the general policy concerns embodied in the single 
larceny rule and the rule against multiplicity of avoiding excessive punishments. Joles 
directly addressed this concern and found that the legislature could not have "reasonably" 
intended to treat an offender of several minor crimes the same as a major offender of 
multiple crimes. 492 So. 2d at 494-95. The same reasoning applies here. 
The Double Jeopardy clauses to the state and federal constitutions raise similar 
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concerns. As this case demonstrates, when the legislature fails to describe the unit of 
prosecution, "overzealous" prosecutions may result. State v. Turner, 6 P.3d 1226, 1230 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000). The ambiguity in the communications fraud statute allowed the 
State to punish Mr. Bradshaw not only for 11 separate acts but also 11 times for taking 
over $5,000 when he took that amount only once. 
The State counters that the legislature has power to prescribe any penalty it wants 
for crimes. State's Brief at 19. Although this assertion in generally true, subject to the 
ban against imposing cruel and unusual punishments, Mr. Bradshaw argues that the 
legislature has shown no intent to allow prosecutors to aggregate the amounts sought 
from all communications made and then to charge multiple felony counts. In the absence 
of the legislature identifying prosecutors' power, the State cannot arbitrarily inflate 
crimes whenever it sees fit without violating double jeopardy principles. Turner. 6 P.3d 
at 1230. 
D. Because the Communications Fraud Statute is 
Ambiguous, the Rule of Lenity Requires this 
Court to Construe it Favorably to Criminal 
Defendants. 
Under each of the doctrines discussed above, whenever a statute is ambiguous, the 
rule of lenity demands giving criminal defendants the lesser of two possible penalties. 
Duncan, 850 F.2d at 1108 n.4; Patience, 944 P.2d at 385; State v. Adel 965 P.2d 1072, 
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1075 (Wash. 1998). Here, at most, this Court should construe the ambiguous language of 
the communications fraud statute as only granting the State discretion to charge each 
communication separately or to aggregate the entire amount sought in an overall scheme 
and charge a single count. This approach upholds this Court's duty to construe 
ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant. Patience, 944 P.2d at 385. 
II. MR. BRADSHAW DID NOT OPERATE A CRIMINAL 
ENTERPRISE BECAUSE HE NEVER FORMED A 
BUSINESS ENTITY NOR WERE HIS ACTIONS 
ANALOGOUS TO A BUSINESS. 
To establish a racketeering crime, the State must show that a person used, invested 
in, or otherwise had an interest in a criminal enterprise. An individual can be an 
enterprise if that person forms a business entity or acts like a business organization. Here, 
Mr. Bradshaw formed no business concern, acted in his individual capacity, and 
minimally associated with others. Contrary to the State's claims, Mr. Bradshaw raised 
these very arguments in the trial court. Moreover, the stipulated facts provided no 
reasonable basis for inferring that Mr. Bradshaw operated a criminal enterprise, in law or 
fact. Thus, Mr. Bradshaw was not subject to enterprise liability. 
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A. Mr, Bradshaw Specifically Argued Below 
That He Acted Individually and Not As An 
Enterprise. 
The State erroneously claims that Mr. Bradshaw failed to preserve his challenge to 
the racketeering charge. Rather than fully addressing the merits of Mr. Bradshaw's 
challenge, the State argues that he "impermissibly expands" his arguments on appeal. 
State's Brief at 22. The State misapplies the preservation doctrine. 
To preserve arguments for appellate review, appellants need only timely raise the 
issues to provide the trial court an "'opportunity'" to decide them. State v. Labium, 925 
P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah) cert, denied 
493 U.S. 814 (1989)). The record reveals that Mr. Bradshaw more than met this standard. 
He specifically argued in his motion to quash that because he acted in his individual 
capacity, "there is no criminal enterprise here." R. 92-93. In particular, Mr. Bradshaw 
asserted that he did not Minvest[] in any enterprise" because he did not engage in any 
activities with an enterprise as that term was statutorily defined. R. 92-94. Rather, he 
argued, in both his motion and at the hearing, that merely paying one's personal bills does 
not constitute enterprise liability. R. 93-94; 156: 7. He argued further that under the 
State's definition of an enterprise, the State could convict any individual for racketeering 
who committed three crimes for financial gain, such as a prostitution or forgery. R. 94. 
The State's preservation arguments appear to be somewhat disingenuous because 
the State litigated this issue, at length. In its opposition to the motion to quash, the State 
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contended that "an individual may be an enterprise" under the definition given in the 
racketeering statute. R. 108. According to the State, individuals who use income derived 
from a scheme for their own interests constituted an enterprise. R. 110. In support of its 
arguments, the State recited the same Utah and federal case law that Mr. Bradshaw raised 
in his opening brief. R. 108-111. Thus, both parties briefed and argued the very issues 
raised in this appeal. 
Because Mr. Bradshaw specifically claimed that he did not constitute or operate an 
enterprise, no questions about preservation exist. On appeal, he has only added case law 
in support of the same arguments he made in the trial court. Because Mr. Bradshaw 
timely raised his claims and provided the trial court an '"opportunity5" to decide them, he 
preserved them for appeal. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 939 (quoting Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 36). 
B. No Enterprise Existed Here Because Mr, 
Bradshaw Formed No Business Entity and He 
Did Not Conduct His Affairs Analogously to a 
Business. 
The State further misconstrues Mr. Bradshaw's arguments by summarily 
dismissing his challenges to enterprise liability. Contrary to the State's assertions, this 
Court has specifically applied federal law in ruling that for a person to constitute an 
enterprise under the first two prongs of the racketeering statute that person must have 
officially formed a business entity or conducted one's affairs consistent with a business. 
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Because neither of those situations applied here, the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss 
the racketeering charge. 
Based on this Court's own application of federal law in State v. Hutchings, 950 
P.2d 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), no enterprise existed. As this Court found in that case, 
the racketeering statute '"was primarily directed at halting the investment of racketeering 
proceeds into legitimate businesses, including the practice of money laundering.'" hi at 
430 (quoting Brittingham v. Mobil Corp., 943 F.2d 297, 304 (3rd Cir. 1991) (emphasis 
added)). Thus, that statute targets business "entities]." Id at 433. As defense counsel 
argued below, any other conclusion would result in a racketeering conviction anytime a 
person commits three similar crimes for personal gain. Weinacht v. State, 744 So. 2d 
1197, 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 682 A.2d 811,816 (Pa. 
Super. 1996). 
This Court made this conclusion clear in Hutchings. Specifically addressing the 
first two prongs of the racketeering statute, this Court held that the defendant's formation 
and operation of a sole proprietorship called Applied Financial Concepts constituted a 
business entity for purposes of establishing an enterprise because it was an "ongoing 
organization that functioned as a continuing unit." Hutchings, 950 P.2d at 434. But, the 
maintaining of shell bank accounts in the defendant's name alone did not establish an 
enterprise because it was not '"analogous to a legal entity such as a coiporation or to an 
association of individuals.'" IdL (quoting Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 283 
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(5th Cir. 1992)). In sum, this Court held that a person only constitutes an enterprise under 
the first two prongs of the racketeering statute if that person fonns an "informal" business 
entity or operates an "association-in fact." kl 
Because Mr. Bradshaw never formed a business entity of any sort, he only 
operated an enterprise if he conducted his affairs as an "association-in-fact." id. Courts 
generally agree that such an association exists when a person engages in activities 
analogous to a business and include an ongoing organization, a common purpose, and 
continuity. United States v. Turkette. 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); State v. Rael 981 P.2d 
280, 283-84 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999); State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 637 (Utah 1988) 
Hutchings, 950 P.2d at 434. None of these factors existed here. At most, the State 
showed that two persons were present when Mr. Bradshaw made an undetermined 
number of misrepresentations and that he asked one of them to falsely portray himself as 
an appraiser. The State presented no evidence that these men shared an intent to defraud, 
perpetuated the misrepresentations, received any compensation, or made any 
misrepresentations themselves. There is no evidence of any structure, organization, 
common purpose, or continuity. Instead, the State merely offers speculation. 
Based on these facts, the State failed to establish a reasonable inference that Mr. 
Bradshaw operated an association-in-fact. To survive a motion to quash, the State must 
present sufficient evidence "to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been 
committed and that the defendant committed it." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 16, 20 P.3d 
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300. Accepting all the stipulated facts as true, the State foiled to meet its burden of 
proving an enterprise. The facts merely show that in addition to the two men's 
observations, Mr. Bradshaw claimed that he held interests in mortgage companies. But, 
these misrepresentations failed to establish that Mr. Bradshaw's actions were analogous 
to a business. He, in fact, did not have any ownership interests in any company. Rather, 
he operated as a lone individual. 
This case is nearly identical to Hutchings, in which the defendant maintained shell 
bank accounts. The defendant in that case established numerous registered and 
unregistered dbas and set up bank accounts for them. 950 P.2d at 427. Although these 
accounts gave the appearance that defendant had connections to numerous legitimate-
sounding businesses, in reality, the defendant was the sole signatory on the accounts and 
the only person who deposited or withdrew money out of them. ]dL This Court reasoned 
that these personal accounts were not analogous to a legal entity because they were 
simply intangible rights. 14. at 434. 
Likewise, Mr. Bradshaw's conduct involved no tangible connection to business. 
There was no evidence of an organization, any ongoing associations, or continuity. 
McGrath, 749 P.2d at 637. Rather, Mr. Bradshaw appeared as a blip on a radar screen for 
less than six months and then disappeared. This ,u[s]poradic, temporary"' activity did not 
amount to a business enterprise. Rael 981 P.2d at 284 (quoting States v. Hughes, 767 
P.2d 382, 389 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988)). Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to 
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dismiss this charge. 
The State mischaracterizes the opening brief when it claims that Mr. Bradshaw 
relies on precedent from the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that Utah courts have 
rejected. State's Brief at 23 n. 13. Mr. Bradshaw has only relied on this Court's 
construction of the applicable prongs of the racketeering statute in Hutchings and the 
federal cases cited therein. The 8th Circuit law that the State refers to merely involves the 
question of whether the State can rely on the same evidence to find a pattern of 
racketeering activity and to establish an enterprise. Hutchings, 950 P.2d at 433. Mr. 
Bradshaw does not dispute that the State may rely on the same evidence. Rather, he 
maintains that under the stipulated facts, the State failed to present any competent 
evidence that he operated an enterprise. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bradshaw requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to 
quash the bind over and to order the trial court to dismiss the criminal information. 
Submitted, this J$5day of October, 2002. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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